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CAPACITY TO BEAR LOSS AS A FACTOR IN THE
DECISION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF TORT CASES

L. W.

FEEZER

In a previous issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review the writer discussed under the present title a number of
tort cases involving municipal corporations.' The purpose was to
point out what seemed to be a noticeable tendency in recent cases
to depart from the rule that a municipal corporation is not liable
for torts arising in connection with a municipal function. It was
suggested that this tendency may be due in part to a desire to
place the burden of loss through injury where it can be borne
with the least hardship. It was noted that this is attained by
placing it where it can be absorbed with a lesser probability of
creating further problems of social adjustment. When the burden in such cases is put upon the defendant, that defendant can
distribute the loss burden over a considerable group, viz., the body
of tax-payers. In this way the loss is ultimately born by the
social organization for whose benefit the risk producing agency
was brought into existence.
The industrialization and mechanization of social organization has brought into existence for the benefit of society great
organizations whose activities involve dangers of injury which
were not present in the simpler and more rural organization of
earlier times. This is not to say that life is less secure now than
when "Adam delved and Eve span", but security of life is menaced
by risks traceable to the "conveniences" which have come to be
regarded as necessities in modern life and which are provided
through great business organizations. Is there traceable, in the
negligence cases involving such organizations as defendants, any
disposition to impose the loss on the defendant in such cases be'Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factorin the Decision of Certain Types

of Tort Cases (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 8o5. Both parts of this paper were
prepared under the direction of Dean Leon Green in connection with a research
problem undertaken at his suggestion during the 1929 summer session of the
Yale Law School.
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cause that type of defendant, drawing its income from compensation received from vast numbers of customers, is thus able to
distribute such losses over society in very slightly increased cost
of the service to each of the thousands of customers receiving the
benefit of this service? If such a development is taking place in
the law of tort, what is the nature of the judicial process employed? Are the courts employing and broadening the concepts
which have been used for dealing with negligence cases or are
they evolving new concepts of legal liability?
HAZARDS CONNECTED WITH GAS COMPANIES

Experience has shown that the production and distribution
of gas fuel involves certain hazards and that many injuries resulting from the operation of this business have produced a very
considerable volume of litigation. The injuries which produce
the great bulk of tort litigation against gas companies involve
fact situations which place them in the following groups: i. Injuries due to leaking gas either by inhalation or explosion.
2. Injuries to vegetation due to escaped gas in air or soil. 3. Injuries due to excavations.

4. Escaping gas, due to negligence, as

a nuisance where no specific harm to person or property is shown.
A gas company has the difficult task of transmitting its
product under some pressure through great lengths of pipe most
of which is not easily accessible after installation, past innumerable joints and valves to thousands or hundreds of thousands of
outlet fixtures. An escape anywhere in this system is likely to do
damage. If escape is to be prevented the following conditions
will apparently have to be satisfied: first, pipes and fixtures must
be carefully made of suitable material -; second, they must be
properly installed; third, they must be maintained under such
inspection as will discover leaks or conditions likely to produce
leaks as far as is reasonably possible; fourth, there must be prompt
- Where pipe was negligently laid, a gas company may be held liable without specific notice of subsequent leak or defect. Dow v. Winnepesaukee Gas &
Electric Co., 69 N. H. 312, 41 Atl. 288 (897),

in which defendant company had

acquired an existing plant, and the court said the defendant immediately became
responsible to keep the plant in a reasonably safe condition. See authorities collected, 29 L. R. A. 337 (1896), 33 L. R. A. 366 (1897).
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repair of leaks whether discovered by the defendants and its
servants or reported to it by others.3
Inhalation and Explosion of Escaped Gas
If there is no conflicting evidence as to conditions of these
sorts in a case where there has been an injury from escaping gas,
the court has simply to deal with the question whether the gas
company owed a duty to the plaintiff in reference to the particular
hazard existent under the circumstances. If the circumstances
are so strong one way or the other that the court believes that
reasonable minds could not differ on the situation it may decide
the case on this issue alone. On the other hand, conflicting evidence or a situation not so obviously favorable to the one side
or the other either on the questions of the existence of the duty
or of its violation, may require a submission of the questions to

a jury.
In any event, it was recognized by the courts as soon as gas
cases began to come before them that gas is a very dangerous substance. It was also recognized that gas is very useful, an almost
4
indispensible utility in urban life.
The development of the law of negligence having been contemporaneous with the growth of the gas business, it is not surprising that there has been an application of negligence formulas
to the working out of standards of care and duty for gas companies. A typical example of this formula appears in a Pennsylvania case as follows: 5
"The definitions of negligence that have been attempted
imply that a higher degree of care and viligance is required
in dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary
affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk of
'A large number of cases involving and discussing this duty cited and digested, 26 A. L. R. 267 (1923). A gas company is held to the duty of making
frequent, indeed very frequent, inspection but is apparently not obliged to maintain a constant inspection of its lines in the absence of any reason to suspect the
existence of a leak. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Croker, 82 Md. 124, 33 Atl. 423
(1895) ; Cooper v. Tristate Gas Co., 3 Ohio App. 77 (1914) ; Morgan v. United
Gas Improvement Co., 214 Pa. log, 63 Atl. 417 (19o6).
' References to this attitude are not uncommon, zz., Triple State Natural
Gas & Oil Co. v. Wellman, 114 Ky. 79, 70 S. W. 49 (1902).
Koelsch v. The Philadelphia Co., 152 Pa. 355, 362, 25 Atl. 522, 524 (1893).
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injury to persons or property. While no absolute standard
of duty in dealing with such agencies can be prescribed, it is
safe to say in general terms that reasonable precautions suggested by experience and the known dangers of the subject
ought to be taken."
Similarly, it is said in an Oregon case,6
"It is plain that a greater degree of absolute care should
be exercised in such circumstances than in conducting a millinery store or carpenter shop. In either case, however, the
care must be proportionate to the risk incurred."
The problem of a gas company's duty is complicated by
variations of practice in different communities as to whether the
gas company or the property owner installs piping and fixtures.
It appears to be the prevailing practice for the gas company to
deliver the gas through a "service pipe" to a stopcock in the pipeline just before the gas enters the meter. After passing this stopcock the gas passes through the meter and enters the system of
piping and fixtures installed by the owner of the premises. If,
after gas service has been established, there is a leak beyond the
meter, the gas company is not ordinarily responsible for injuries
which may result.- Although the stopcock is on what may be
called the gas company's side of the meter, it is evidently the prevailing practice for the company to install the meter.
Sometimes the service pipe belongs to the customer and is
his installation in which case he becomes responsible for damage
caused by leaks in it."
A frequent source of trouble is the re-establishment of gas
service in a building after it has been discontinued without re'Sharkey v. Portland Gas Co., 74 Ore. 327, 330, 144 Pac. 1152, 1153 (1914).
Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Kelley, IO5 Okla. i89, 232 Pac. 428 (1924); Helm v.
Mfrs. Light and Heat Co., 86 W. Va. 628, lO4 S. E. 59 (I92o). But where a gas
company installs piping, fixtures, or appliances, it becomes responsible for them.
The usual duties of inspection, prompt repair upon notice, etc., will then be imposed upon the gas company. McClure v. Hooperstown Gas & El. Co., 3o3 Ill.
89, 135 N. E. 43 (922), 25 A. L. R. 250 (1923); Coffeyville Mining and Gas
Co. v. Carter, 65 Kan. 565, 70 Pac. 635 (1902).
' See 25 A. L. R. 262-272 (1923), for collected cases, also Reid v. Westchester Lighting Co., 236 N. Y. 332, 14o N. E. 712 (1923); Okmulgee Gas Co.
v. Kelly, lO5 Okla. 189, 232 Pac. 428 (1924).
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moval of the piping and fixtures. Sometimes the gas is turned
off at the stopcock through which the gas passes before entering
the meter. In this case the service pipe is stored with gas. Sometimes it is turned off at the curb, approximately where the gas
leaves the main and enters the service pipe. Many cases seem
to indicate that the latter is the method of real "foolproof" safety."
It has been mentioned that the service pipe is often the customer's
installation, and if, in such a situation, the gas company turns off
the gas at the meter end of the service pipe rather than at the
curb line in front of the premises, it is generally held that the
company adopts the service pipe as its own and (during the period
of discontinued service) becomes responsible for the service pipe
and for the gas stored in it. 10
When the gas company turns on the gas in an installation
there is always a possibility that there may be in the building an
uncapped service pipe, a leaking fixture, an open stopcock, etc.
This situation may arise either when gas is turned on for the first
time in an installation or when service is re-established after the
gas has been shut off for a time. Such a condition, of course,
means a leak. The place of the leak, if an open stopcock, may
have been forgotten or overlooked by the applicant for the service,
or if a defective condition, may have been discoverable only after
pressure was turned into the installation. Whose is the duty to
make sure that all openings or leaks have been checked and made
secure before gas service can be said to have been properly started?
Earlier decisions and dicta seem not to have imposed so
strict a responsibility upon the gas companies as the more recent
11
ones.
'Reid v. Westchester Lighting Co., supra note 8.
1o Note (908)
7 MimN. L. REy. 251.
2 The earlier cases seem to have made the gas company responsible only in
case it had some reason to suspect a leak or that some alteration had been made
in the system of piping which might cause a leak. Vi.., Southern Indiana Gas
Co. v. Tyner, 49 Ind. App. 475, 97 N. E. 58o (1912) ; Skogland v. St. Paul Gas
Light Co., 89 Minn. i, 93 N. W. 668 (1903) ; Lennon v. Union Gas and El. Co.,
4 Ohio App. 153 (1915); Dodge v. Halifax Gas Co., 9 N. S. 325 (1893). On

the other hand several recent cases have placed upon the gas company a very
strict duty to stay on the job in premises where gas has been turned on until it
is practically certain that there is no opportunity for it to escape. Sawyer v. So.
Cal. Gas Co., 206 Cal. 377, 274 Pac. 544 (i929).
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One of the formulas of the law which has been helpful to
plaintiffs in establishing the responsibility of companies operating
the complex industrial and mechanical enterprises of the modern
day is the rule of "res ipsa loquitur". It has been much applied
in cases involving the hazards which are more characteristic of
modern industry than of a simpler time. It has been so generously applied in aid of passengers injured on railroads that
today nearly all such cases are settled without litigation unless
the railroad company feels that it has a good chance of establishing a defense in the fault of the plaintiff such as contributory
negligence.
The application of this rule to a gas company was discussed
in McClure v. Hooperstown Gas and Electric Co.,' 2 in which it

was said that the plaintiff need not show how the ignition of the
gas and the resulting explosion took place, and that evidence of
the existence of a leak together with defendant's notice thereof
was sufficient to take to the jury the question of the company's
responsibility. However, the mere fact of injury from gas will
not make a case on which the plaintiff may submit to a jury the
question of the gas company's responsibility. This is, of course,
quite proper because the escape of gas may have been due to the
act of someone else in opening a gas cock. 1 3 However, proof of
a break or leak in a gas pipe under the defendant's control will
serve to make the doctrine applicable.' 4
It would seem that when the gas company touches piping or fixtures on
anyone's premises, it undertakes a duty to follow up the matter and be assured
that all connections are tight. Bell v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 193 App. Div.
669, 184 N. Y. Supp. 807 (i92o). Even checking the fixtures is not enough, nor
is watching the meter dials for indication of flow of gas. Both precautions must
be taken. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Sams, 29 Ga. App. 446, II6 S. E. 21 (x923).
'Supra note 7.
"Marysville Gas Co. v. Brodheck, I4 Ohio St. 423, 151 N. E. 323 (1926);
Laurent v. United Fuel Gas Co., ioi W. Va. 499, 133 S. E. 116 (19-6).
"Woodburn v. Union Light Heat and Power Co., 164 Ky. 29, 174 S. W.
730 (1915); Sipple v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 125 Mo. App. 8I, io2 S. W. 6o8
(0907) ; Sharkey v. Portland Gas Co., 74 Ore. 327, 114 Pac. 1152 (1914);
Cracraft v. Wichita Gas Co., 126 Kan. 775, 271 Pac. 273 (1929), aff'd, x-i Kan.
741, 275 Pac. 164 (i29), where it was held proper to leave the case to the jury on
the "circumstantial" evidence. In that case two gas lines ran through the same
street. In some way gas found its way through the ground and entered a basement through a sewer. The defendant's line was shown to be leaky. There
was no evidence of any leak in the other company's gas line. The jury concluded from the circumstances that the gas which caused the explosion came
from defendant's line rather than the other one.
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In the explosion cases one might well expect to find the
opinions treating the problem of how the gas was ignited as a
question of proximate cause and discussing whether or not the
ignition was not an independent intervening cause, but the Illinois
court dismissed that argument in the Hooperstown case by referring to it as a question for the jury. In short, the court having
determined that there was a duty on the part of the defendant
to protect persons in the plaintiff's position from the hazard of
escaped gas, the fact that gas did escape constituted a sufficient
causal factor to make the defendant liable for its explosion if the
jury should find negligence, viz., that some harm was foreseeable. 5
The question whether the concurrent negligence of a third
person operating in conjunction with the negligence of the gas
company will defeat liability seems to have given the courts some
trouble and to have produced standards of duty which could not
but produce inharmonious results. In Skogland v. St. Paul Gas
Light Co., 6 the landlady of a rooming house called the defendant
company to thaw the frost out of the gas pipes. For this purpose
the company's workman temporarily turned off the gas. The
plaintiff, a lodger, was taking a nap with the lights on and was
not notified by the landlady that the gas was to be turned off.
She was injured by the inhalation of gas which escaped from the
fixture in her room when it was turned back on. The Minnesota
Supreme Court in sustaining a directed verdict for the defendant
said it would be unreasonable to require the company to go
through the house to look at each jet and see that it was properly
turned off when pressure was restored. The most analogous case
A break in the service pipe was held sufficient basis for applying res ipsa
loquitur in Manning v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 129 Minn. 55, 151 N. W. 423
(1915) ; likewise, that gas was leaking from a pipe in the street in Di Sondro V.
Providence Gas Co., 40 R. I. 551, 102 Atl. 617 (1918) ; also Brown v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 299 Fed. 463 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
' The court stated of res ipsa loquitur as applied to the facts in the Hooperstown case, "it cannot be said that the result of escaping gas must necessarily
be an explosion or fire. . . . A jury may find negligence from the breaking
of a gas pipe and the consequent escape of gas but it is for them to decide
whether they will so find or not. And if there are other circumstances in the
case they must weigh them all."

:'689
Minn. I, 93 N. W. 668 (19o3).
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which can be found is Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Sains decided
twenty years later.' 7 The factual distinction is that the lodger
in the Saws case occupied a part of the apartment in which the
repair was being made, which, however, was not under the control of the tenant with whom the defendant's employee talked
about the condition and occupancy of the premises. In short, no
one knew whether Sams was in his room or not until later when
his dead body was discovered. The tenant in the Saws case, although not in control of that part of the apartment in which he
lodged, agreed to see to the fixture in Sams' room which was
locked "when the gas man came in".
In the Saws case the plaintiff had a verdict from the jury.
This was affirmed in an opinion which is largely lifted bodily
from that in the Skogland case, but the cases can not be reconciled.
The Sanis case was a better one for the defendants than the
Skogland case. Here is a situation which seems to the writer to
indicate the working of other factors than the strict theology of
negligence. In the Sko gland case the plaintiff was soon awakened
upon the smell of gas being detected as coming from her room.
The injury, if any, was small and both court and jury were willing to let it rest where it fell. In the Sams case on the other hand,
a bright and promising young man loses his life. He is the son
of poor but deserving parents. The human disposition to shift
the loss leads the court to a different criterion of duty.
Injuries to Vegetation
One of the frequent consequences of escaping gas is injury
to vegetation and the liability of gas companies for this type of
injury where the defendant is chargeable with negligence is asserted in a large number of opinions. In Gould.v. Winona Gas
Co.,18 Jaggard, J., defines the duty of a gas company with reference to escaping gas as resting upon the standard of "due care
commensurate with the danger". He expressly repudiates the
suggestion of degrees of care. The greater portion of this opin1"29

i00
1s

Ga. App. 446, II6 S. E. 21 (923).
Minn. 258, 269, III N. IV. 254, 258 (19o7).
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ion is devoted to an attempt to justify the refusal to include gas
in the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands which is recognized in
Minnesota. 19 The opinion deals at length with the applicability
of "res ipsa loquiti" to such cases.
The opinion in the Gould case is an interesting one in which
to observe the working of the judicial process. On the one hand
there is the inherent repugnance to the idea of liability without
fault; 20 on the other hand are competing factors struggling for
expression. There is the desirability of extending a high degree
of protection t6 interests of personality and individual property
as against the risk of danger from subtle insidious things like
gas and electricity. Judge Jaggard recognizes the futility of attempting to define degrees of care or negligence, since they would
be helpful only in the particular factual situation, and as precedents
would tend to hamper the court in the correct determination of
future cases. The solution selected is to say that this is a case
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. The court says: 21
"Gas pipes are not a chartered nuisance. The step downwards from the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is too great to be
taken in this jurisdiction. The very fact that the instrumentality doing damage is peculiarly and inherently dangerous is a common and proper consideration for the application
of the maxim.

.

.

. One of the essentials to the applica-

tion of the maxim is clearly present: The agency was admittedly in the exclusive management of the defendant.
The other essential is also here: The result was such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management used proper care." 22
" Cahill

v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872); Berger v. Gas Light Co., 6o

Minn. 296, 62 N. W,.336 (1895) ; Wiltse v. Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255,

1O9

N. W.

114 (1go6).

' Thayer, Liability without Fault (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 801; McDonald,
The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its Limitation (1923) 57 Am. L. REV. 549;
(1923) I CA-. BAR. REv. 140; Bohlen, The Rule in. Rylands v. Fletchcr (igio)
59 U. OF PA. L. REN. 298, 373, 423.
' Gould v. Winona Gas Co., supra note iS, at 266, III N. W. at 257.
22 ILL. L. REV. 724.

- As to requirements for applicability of res ipsa loquitur, see Notes (1925)
23 MICH. L. REV. 785; (1927) 25 MIcE. L. REv. 470; (1925) 9 MINN. L. REv.
577; Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrinc of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928)
22 ILL. L. REv. 724.
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Conclusion
It appears to the writer that in so far as the gas company
cases indicate any inclination on the part of the courts to take
account of the various intangible factors such as capacity to bear
the loss of injury arising out of the operation of gas works, the
device chiefly used to this end is the res ipsa loquitur rule.
There are several existing and recognized formulas which
might be applied in determining a gas company's duty with reference to injuries. The individualist point of view of a gas company's responsibility in relation to its place in the social order can
be effectuated by the rule of "due care under the circumstances",
and it has been extensively used. The social interest in security
of person and property against explosion might be so strongly
developed as to make the gas company an insurer. This, however,
in the absence of legislation has not been the rule. A somewhat
intermediate position has resulted by the use of due care test plus
res ipsa loquitur which will and in most cases does furnish a basis
for taking care of hard cases. Whether we call the rule of res
ipsa loquitur a presumption or merely an authority to the jury to
draw inferences, the result, where it is applied, will work out that
unless the gas company can show that the accident was due entirely to causes other than its negligence, the plaintiff will recover.
In other words, once a case of this sort is given to the jury with
instructions incorporating the res ipsa loquitur formula, the defendant will in practice have to convince the jury actually "beyond
a reasonable doubt" and not merely by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the entire fault lay in some other source than his
(defendant's) conduct.33
The Sams case -4 already referred to illustrates another
scheme of rationalization resorted to where res iflsa loquitur will
not apply, namely, the extension of the "duty to inspect" idea as
a measure of due care under the circumstances.
It is not easy to find any marked indications of a desire to
shift the risk of loss from injuries due to the activities of gas
'Hughes v. Atlantic City R. R., 85 N. J. L. 212, 214, 89 At. 769, 770
See Heckel and Harper, op. cit. supra note 22.
"' See supra note 17.

(914).
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companies. The use of the res ipsa loquitur formula has been
referred to but its use here is not significant of any marked process
of evaluation in the methods of dealing with these cases, or of
the manner in which courts are deciding them. Where the gas
leaks from pipes and fixtures under the control of the defendant
a situation calling for this formula of rationalization is likely
enough to arise, but does not seem to have produced any peculiar
standard of care for defendants in this kind of business or to
have resulted in any unusual developments of that doctrine.
As already indicated the few points mentioned here have
been selected after examination of the majority of tort cases
against gas companies which the writer has been able to discover.
There is plainly only one conclusion as to the influence which has
been exerted by a consideration of the social utility of placing
the risk where it can best be borne. There is no articulate recognition of this in the decisions. If this factor enters in this type of
tort cases it is one of the hidden factors and is no more evident
here than in the general average of negligence cases which might
be selected without reference to the economic position of the defendant or the fact that his position enables him to distribute
losses. If one seeks to show that the courts are tending to impose
a greater responsibility on corporate defendants who have this
risk-shifting advantage he will find scant support in the "gas"
cases.
This is in some contrast to what appears to be taking place
in the law of municipal liability for tort as was pointed out by
the writer in the first part of this paper.2 5
In that connection,
however, we were facing a somewhat different situation. There
we began with an arbitrary rule of "no liability", irrespective
of fault. It appears that there is a tendency to lreak away from
that point of view and to apply the more general standards of

legal responsibility. Here we begin with an application of the
orthodox negligence concept and we do not find that it is giving
way to any noticeable degree to what might be called a socialized
theory of responsibility.
Feezer, op. cit. supra note i.
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If there is any indication of an increasing duty upon gas
companies it is to be found not so much in that recent cases are
announcing any new types of duty or standards of care but in
that most of the cases in which the duty of a gas company is
discussed are very recent ones.
HAZARDS CONNECTED WITH WATERWORKS

Waterworks whether public 26 or private may be the cause
of numerous injuries to persons or property. The types of injuries most frequently producing litigation seem to be due to one
of the following causes: (a) dangers arising out of the activities
carried on in the construction or operation of plants, (b) leaking
or bursting mains, (c) impurities in water, (d) failure of water
supply.
It is obvious that lack of care in construction operations may
result in injury in view of the fact that they take place so largely
in the streets where numbers of persons may encounter them. As
to the rules applied by the courts in fixing the standards of care
and duty in such cases it may be said that in general they are
dealt with under the ordinary negligence formulas although a few
cases have treated the value of the franchise to use the public
streets as a consideration for justifying the imposition of a rather
special duty to keep in good repair any apparatus placed in the
streets such as hydrants, stop valves, manholes, etc.
The duty to guard excavations is dealt with in Smith v.
Baton Rouge Water Co. "-, In this case a mother left her small
child on the porch of her home and went into the house. A very
few moments later the child was found dead in the bottom of a
hole in the street in front of the house which had been dug by the
defendant for the purpose of repairing water mains. There were
no barricades around the excavation. Judgment for the plaintiff
in the trial court was reversed by the court of appeals on the

ground that as the water company had been making excavations
-'It may be noted at the outset that a municipality is liable on the same
terms as a private owner. See 2 1cQuILLE\, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1928)
§ 2852.

279 La. Ct. of App. 19, 119 So. 98

(1928).
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like this from time to time during the seventeen years of its existence and leaving them unguarded without any drownings, such
a consequence was unforeseeable and hence there was no negligence. The Supreme Court of the state properly overruled this
judgment, saying: 2s
"The defendant company, in our opinion, was guilty of
a plain and palpable omission of duty. The excuse which it
offers for its conduct is utterly unacceptable. . . . Because
the company was fortunate in escaping accidents for a number of years is no justification for its continuing to do a
thing which, according to common experience, is highly dangerous."
In the majority of cases in which recovery has been sought
for the drowning of infant trespassers in ponds, reservoirs, and
like works maintained by water companies, recovery has not been
allowed. Even those courts which have recognized the "attractive
nuisance" or "turntable" doctrine have been reluctant to apply it
to anything so much resembling a natural thing as a pool of water.
The statement in one of the annotations - that the attempt to
extend the doctrine to dangers of the class of pools, reservoirs,
and waterways has been unsuccessful, seems to be true.
It is interesting to inquire what has been the influence of
Fletcher v. Rylands 30 in determining the liabilities of water companies. It might well have been expected to be applied to water
escaping from mains but such has not been the case. Before the
time of Fletcher v. Rylands it had been decided in England that
water companies were not liable without negligence for the escape
of water from their mains and that decision did not directly change
166 La. 471, 478, 117 So. 559, 56i (1928).
Cox v. Alabama Water Co., 216 Ala. 35, 112 So. 352 (1927). The annotation referred to, i9 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1143 (i9oo), collects a large number of

cases. A great many more will be found collected in 36 A. L. R. 243 (1925) ; 53
A. L. R. 1355 (1928).
' Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 Hurl. & Colt 774, 34 L. J. Ex. 177 (1865) (Court
of Exchequer) ; Fletcher v. Rylands, 4 Hurl. & Colt 263, 35 L. J. Ex. 154 (1866)
(Exchequer Chamber); Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868), ig L. T.
220 (1868) (House of Lords). Lord Blackburn's famous rule was stated as follows: "One who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it in at his peril, and,
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape."
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the basis of their responsibility. 3 1 The same situation prevails
in the law of this country even in the states which follow the
Rylands case. 32 However a somewhat different attitude has been
adopted by a few courts having to deal with cases involving the
destructive force of water under extraordinarily high pressure. In
Charing Cross Electric Supply Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co., 3 3 the
defendant, pursuant to special license under statutory authority
had laid under the street a high pressure main for the purpose of
supplying water for power purposes such as the operation of lifts.
This main burst injuring the plaintiff's underground electric
cables. The Court applied the rule of Fletcher v. Rylands. In
this country, Minnesota, which in a number of situations has
recognized the Fletcher v. Rylands principle,3 4 decided an interesting case in 1924.30 The City of Duluth had a very large
reservoir on a hill two hundred feet higher than plaintiff's property from which water was conducted past the plaintiff's premises
in a twenty inch main. This main burst causing nearly $5o,ooo
damages to this property. No negligence was alleged but the
Fletcher v. Rylands principle was relied on. In overruling the
demurrer Holt, J., says: 36
reason and the interest of justice seem to favor
adherence to the rule rather than the reverse. Congestion
of population in large cities is on the increase. This calls
for water systems on a vast scale. . . . Water in immense
quantities must be accumulated and held where none of it
existed before. If a break occurs in the reservoir itself, or
in the principal mains, the flood may utterly ruin an individual financially. In such a case, even though negligence
be absent, natural justice would seem to demand that the
enterprise, or what really is the same thing, the whole comS'Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., 70 L. T. 547 (1894) ; Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., L. R. io Q. B. 453 (1875), 44 L. J.Q. B. (zr. s.) 139
(1875), 33 L. T. 475 (1875).

= McCord Rubber Co. v. St. Joseph Water Co., i8r Mo. 678, 81 S. W. 189

(1904).

3 [I914] 3 K. B. 772.

Cahill v. Eastman, i8 Minn.
255, iii

292

(1872); Wiltse v. Red Wing, 99 Minn.

N. W. 1134 (i9o6).

' Bridgman Russell Co. v. Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 197 N. W. 971 (1924).
"'Ibid.at 511, 197 N. W. at 972.
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Mnunity benefited by the enterprise, should stand the loss
rather than the individual37 It is too heavy a burden upon
one. The trend of modern legislation is to relieve the individual from the mischance of business or industry without
regard to its being caused by negligence. Our safety appliance acts, workmen's compensation acts, are examples."

The disastrous nature of this break appears to have greatly
impressed the court and induced the utterance of an opinion which
goes farther than any other the writer has been able to discover
in recognizing the factor of capacity to bear loss. Seldom indeed
is it that one reads in a judicial opinion such language. Among
the great number of cases against waterworks companies and
municipalities which the writer has examined in an effort to find
out just what part this factor has played in their decision, no
other case has been found which really frankly admits in explicit
language the place of this factor in passing judgment. But the
court proceeds to rationalize its decision upon grounds more orthodox. Suppose this action had been brought in a jurisdiction
not accepting the Fletcher v. Rylands rule. As this case was
pleaded the result would probably have been a nonsuit. But suppose the complaint to have contained comprehensive allegations
of negligence, would the court be able to concede the existence
of a cause of action without doing violence to its formed categories of legal responsibility? The Minnesota opinion suggests
that liability might be imposed on the theory of trespass but, having the Fletcher v. Rylands precedent, does not work out the
trespass theory.
A few other cases of extensive damage due to large leaks
seem to indicate some readiness to find evidence of negligence on
which to send the case to the jury.3S In a New York case " where
old water pipes burst when the higher pressure from a new supply
was turned on, the city argues that it was not negligent because of
' Italics the author's.
'Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 267 Pac. iou (Utah 1928) ; Public Service Co.
of Colorado v. Williams, 84 Colo. 342, 270 Pac. 659 (1928).
'Haas v. City of New York, 107 Misc. 427, 176 N. Y. Supp. 433 (1919),
aff'd. x9o App. Div. 939, 179 N. Y. Supp. 924 (920).
See also Capital Trust
Co. v. Schenectady, I03 Misc. 56, 231 N. Y. Supp. 119 (1928).
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the impracticability of taking up the old pipes.
the city liable saying: 40

The court held

"The city cannot escape liability by voluntarily avoiding such expense and then practically making a more economical test [of turning on the higher pressure] at plaintiff's
cost."
On the other hand Pennsylvania sustained a nonsuit in an
action against the City of Philadelphia when a temporary repair
in the high pressure fire lines burst.4 In this situation it may
be important that the plaintiff was a large corporation and that
the break occurred when the pressure was considerably increased
during a serious fire. -Moreover this line was used only for fire
protection and non-liability might have been predicated upon the
theory that the maintenance of the high pressure line was a governmental function.
A few cases have been discovered in which the rule of res
ipsa loquitur has been applied to leaking water pipes and in the
case of bursting pipes its application appears to be quite general. 42
The problem of the liability of a waterworks company for
leakage following frost has been familiar to students of torts
through the case of Blythe v. Birningham TVater ,orks Co. 43 An
extraordinary frost forced the plug out of the defendant's pipes
causing the water to escape and run into the plaintiff's cellar.
Judgment was given for defendant. Alderson, B., after stating
in effect that the whole thing was an accident caused by frost
which was unforeseen and that the cause was not discovered until
long after, though the defendants looked for it, held that this
could not be called negligence. He gives us his definition of neg4 Haas v. City of New York, supra note 39, at 429, 176 N. Y. Supp. at 434.
11Ritz-Carton Co. v. Philadelphia, 282 Pa. 301, 127 Atil. 843 (1925).
1-Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. Portland, 34 Ore. 282, 55 Pac. 96i (1899), 43
L. R. A. 435 (899).
There are a few cases in which it has been held that the mere fact that a
water main burst is in itself evidence of want of care by the city or corporation
to whom it belongs. Rainier Heat & Power Co. v. City of Seattle, 193 Pac. 233,
113 Wash. 95 (g2o)

Pac. 6
43

(1921).

; Hub Clothing Co. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wash. 251, :2o

1 Exch. 781 (1856).
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ligence and his reasons why the present facts do not come within
it in the following words: *4
"Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.
.
A reasonable man would act with reference
to the average circumstances of the temperature in ordinary
years. The defendants had provided against such frosts
as experience would have led men, acting prudently, to provide against; and they are not guilty of negligence, because
their precautions proved insufficient against the effects of the
extreme severity of the frost of 1855..
Only a few years later there seems to have been another
"extraordinary" frost in England which started a water plug and
resulted in flooding a cellar. This same situation which had been
litigated in Birmingham came before the courts again in Steggles
v. New River Company -5 upon very similar facts-(the defendant claimed they were precisely similar). This time the court of
Queen's Bench held that there was evidence of negligence to take
the case to the jury in that no precautions were taken against even
ordinary frost and hence the rule to set aside the verdict for the
plaintiff was discharged.
The plaintiff argues that granting the precedent of Blythe v.
Birmingham Water-works Co. he should be able to recover here.
He points out that in the Birmingham case all possible precautions
were taken and here no precautions have been taken. So far as
the reports of these cases indicate, the conditions as to precautions
were the same. In the Birmingham case, apparently no special
precautions had been taken against frost, because frost had never
produced this injury before, hence when looked at ex post facto
(as the law always does in passing on the existence of negligence)
there was no negligence. But five years later, Christmas, 186o,
another extraordinary frost produces the same kind of damage.
This time the situation looked at ex post facto again makes a
"Ibid. at 784.
ii W. R. 234 (1862).
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different impression. At least it looks so different that the English
judges are willing to let a jury take the case and find for the
plaintiff.
What is happening to the law of England on the subject of
liability of water companies? Or perhaps we should ask, what
is happening to the point of view of English judges? The first
time an "extraordinary" frost starts a water plug in the north
of England there is no negligence, but when the same thing happens five years later, the judge appears to recognize the existence
of some duty to take precautions against frost. The court indicates that it is not very clear just what precautions are indicated
but after all, the court has come to believe that something should
be done to prevent recurrences of this sort of thing. It is left
to the water companies to work out the engineering but unless
something is done, the water companies will be held liable for
the consequences even if the frost is "extraordinary". Yet in
the brief opinion in this case the fact that the frost is extraordinary is not even referred to. In short, the court has in effect
notified the water companies that this flooding of peoples' premises through the bursting out of water plugs whenever there is
a very hard frost has got to stop, or the water companies must
bear the loss. Here is, it seems to me, some indication that the
loss should be cast upon the enterprise rather than the individual.
The Hazard of Impure Water
Water companies have been subjected to many suits for damages due to users of their product contracting typhoid fever.4
They are usually held liable in such cases where they knew or
should have known that the water was contaminated in such a
way as to render it undesirable for drinking -even though they
may not have known that the polluting material included the bacilli
of typhoid.*7
" See collected cases

S A.

L. R. 1402 (920).

' Stein v. State, 37 Ala. 123 (x86i) ; Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Lincoln Trust
Co., 167 N. E. 721 (Ind. 1929) ; Stubbs v. Rochester, 226 N. Y. 516, 124 N. E.
137 (1919); Buckingham v. Plymouth Water Co., 142 Pa. 221, 21 Atl. 824

(i89i).

760

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

The formula by which liability is imposed appears in much
the same terms in current cases that it did in earlier ones, but
there is evidence, it seems to the writer, that its application calls
for entirely different conduct upon the part of a water company
today than it did a generation ago if that company is to avoid
liability for an epidemic of typhoid fever among its patrons.
Sixty years ago there was nothing in the law about impure
water as a cause of typhoid fever. Thirty years ago we began
to have cases which discussed the responsibility of a water company with reference to the existence of cases of typhoid fever
upon the watershed from which its reservoir was supplied. Now
we find references to open "by-pass" valves between the public
domestic supply system and private systems belonging to corporations, and to the failure of chlorination of water turned into the
mains even for a few hours.
A recent California case recognizes the adequate functioning
of the chlorination treatment of a public water supply as an
element in the standard of due care to be observed. In Ritterbusch v. Pittsburgh 4S it appeared that for a period of some twelve
hours unchlorinated water was let into the mains and three weeks
later an epidemic of typhoid and dysentery appeared in the town.
Plaintiff's decedent was a victim of this epidemic. It was held
that these circumstances were sufficient to take to the jury the
question of the legal responsibility of the city as operator of the
waterworks. The case involved nineteen suits against the city
to be decided upon the law as determined in the one appeal.
Where recovery is sought for illness due to impure water,
the problem of causal relation is one which is very frequently
discussed. If A, living in a community supplied by the X water
company, is taken ill with typhoid fever, does it follow that he
was infected by drinking the water, even though it does appear
that the water supply was polluted? It is known that typhoid
may be communicated in a number of different ways. It is also
thoroughly well recognized by bacteriologists that the bacillus
typhosus can seldom be demonstrated in a water supply even when
" 205

Cal. 84, 269 Pac. 930 (1928).
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it is heavily polluted. Medically, other evidence is accepted as
circumstantially sufficient to condemn a water supply as a potential
source of typhoid. Shall the law accept such circumstantial evidence? The answer is that if the gap between cause and effect
is to be bridged, it must accept such evidence, and it does. This
was clearly recognized in Jones v. Mt. Holly TVater Company in
1915 4' and has been repeated in most of the cases since which
have involved the point. It is well put in a very recent New York
case, Wiesner v. City of Albany: 'o
"Of course, owing to the fact that many people are immune and the typhoid germs are microscopic in size, the
method of infection cannot be determined by direct proof
but evidence of the source of infection must be circumstantial.
To insist that the plaintiff must establish that the infection
came from the city water by positive proof would be to require an impossibility. It is sufficient if it is shown by the
best evidence available that the bacilli were introduced into
his system by means of the city water, so that the jury may
by reasonable inference reach a conclusion to that effect. This
is not speculation, but a process of logical deduction."
There are suggestions that liability for supplying impure
water deleterious to health should be predicated upon implied
warranty as well as upon negligence.
In Canavan v. ,M1echanicville*'1 the New York Court of Appeals held that the furnishing of water is a sale of goods under
the personal property law but that there is no implied warranty
that it is free from deleterious matter. The court, therefore,
sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's warranty count. Judges
Pound, Elkus, and Hogan dissented. However, the plaintiff's
negligence count was sustained. The opinion in this case appears
to show the operation of the economic factor in the judicial process
52
when it states,
" 87 N. J. L. io6, 93 Atl. 86o (1915).
ro 238 App. Div. 239, 242, 229 N. Y. Supp. 622, 625 (1928).
31229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (i92o), accord diction in Aronson v. City of
Everett, 136 Wash. 312, 239 Pac. iOuI (1925) to the effect that the liability of
city for supplying impure water is based on negligence, not implied warranty.
' Canavan v. Mechanicville, supra note 5I, at 481, 128 N. E. at 884.
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"Men will not form corporations which the court will
hold obligated, at a risk which may bankrupt and destroy
them, to enter into a guaranty or warranty which they cannot
fulfill."
The majority opinion in this case, in holding that water supplied through pipes did not come within the statutory provision
covering sales of food at retail, that there is an implied warranty
of fitness for consumption, relied on a statutory provision providing that there is no such warranty except where the buyer expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required.
The dissent pointed out that the defendant managed and
controlled the water supply and had full opportunity to ascertain
its freedom from injurious matter. Elkus, J., said: 53
"The public welfare demands that a municipality supplying such an important element in the life of the people as
water should be held to a strict liability if they fail to fulfil
their full duty in this regard. . . . The warranty as to the
purity of the water supplied to the inhabitants of a city should
be implied. . . . The defendant, - the municipality, had
every means of ascertaining whether the water which it supplied was fit for the purpose it impliedly warranted it to be,
viz., to drink..... A competent analysis would have disclosed impurities in any appreciable quantity and suitable precautions could have been taken."
Later in this opinion, answering the economic argument of
the majority, Elkus says:5"The taxpayers like the stockholders of a corporation
may be injured by the installation of incompetents in office,
but this should not affect the course of justice in rendering
relief to those injured ....
The remedy of the taxpayer
is the removal of the incompetent official. Human life and
health are of the greatest importance because the greatest
asset which the state has is the lives of its people and any'
rule of law which tends to enhance and improve the general
health and life of the people of the state should be upheld." "5
'Ibid. at 488, 128 N. E. at 887.
ibid. at 489, 128 N. E. at 887.
' Italics the author's.
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The dissent in this case also seems to the writer to take account (although perhaps unconsciously) of the capacity to bear
loss. It states, for example,"'
"When a municipal corporation fails to fulfil the duty
placed upon it, and the warranty it makes when it undertakes to supply its inhabitants with the water necessary to
human life and by reason thereof certain individuals suffer
damage, then the municipality must indemnify such individuals."
Inasmuch as the majority opinion deals chiefly with the question of whether the warranty count was demurrable and sustained
the negligence count, its chief interest lies in the revelation of
the efforts of the dissenting judges, who evidently felt that recovery should in justice be allowed, to work out a solution through
the formula of warranty in order that the risk might be shifted
upon the party whom these judges thought should bear it, in case
he should be unable to prove his negligence count.
ContributoryNegligence in Using Contaminated Water
If the water supply of a city is contaminated with sewage
and there are present in the city many cases of typhoid and this
condition has existed for some time and is well known to every
one in town, will a person who drinks the water and contracts
typhoid be precluded from recovery under the doctrine of contributory negligence? In a Wisconsin case 57 involving the fact
situation just suggested, it was held that plaintiff's decedent had
been guilty of contributory negligence in continuing to drink
water from the defendant's mains in view of the evidence that he
knew of its dangerous qualities. It seems impossible to suggest
a basis of making effective the duty which the law purports to
impose upon water companies, in the face of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Here is an instance in which strict adherence to the concept of contributory negligence will seriously hamper the law in evolving a program of tort responsibility consistent
: Canavan v. Mechanicville, supra note 51, at 488, 128 N. E. at 887.
Green v. Ashland Water Co., Ioi Wis. 258, 77 N. W. 722 (i89S).
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with modern standards of social justice. Is relief possible without legislation, will the courts be able in such cases as this to
rationalize a new code of responsibility adequate to modern conditions in the presence of so firmly intrenched a defensive mechanism as that of contributory negligence and assumption of risk?
Property Damage
There are a few cases involving property damages because
of the impurity of a water supply. If the water is such as is fit
for ordinary domestic use it may nevertheless be unsuitable for
use in certain kinds of industrial processes. There is at least
evident a tendency to hold that if the water is to be used for a
purpose which does not require properties substantially different
from those which permits its ordinary domestic use without harm
or serious inconvenience the company will be liable for injuries
resulting from its commercial use if these ordinary standards
have not been maintained. In a recent Georgia case "Sthe water
supplier was held liable to a bottler of beverages for not giving
notice that it was using chloride of lime in treating the water, in
view of the company's knowledge that it was to be used in preparing a beverage which would be rendered so unpalatable as to
be unsalable by the presence of this chemical, but where "the
water being furnished is reasonably satisfactory for all purposes
except the 'peculiar and uncommon uses to which it is put in the
conduct of the plaintiff's business' " and there is no other source
of supply which is reasonably available there is no error in holding
the defendant not liable.59
Failure of Water Supplies
There remains at least one other type of case which should
be mentioned, viz., the problem of the liability of water companies
for physical injuries to property by reason of the failure of water
supply. In a recent Indiana case 'o the owner of a green house
" Griffin v. Griffin Chero-Cola Co., 35 Ga. App. 779, 134 S. E. 812 (1926).
"Oakes Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 2o6 N. Y. 221, 230, 99 N. E. 540,
542 (1912).

' City of Huntingburg v. Morgen, 162 N. E. 255 (Ind. 1928).
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sued the city in its proprietary capacity as operator of a water
supply for injury to his plants due to failure of water pressure.
The Indiana Supreme Court allowed recovery although liability
for fire damage due to failure of water supply is not imposed in
that jurisdiction. 6 1 The Court gives as the reason for distinction
that fire protection is a governmental function whether the city
itself owns the water supply or contracts for it with a private
2
owner, but says the court,
"In supplying water to the inhabitants of the city for
daily consumption the well-established rule is that the city
is liable on the same principle that a private corporation engaged in the same business is liable."
This generalization by which the court distinguishes the
present case from one of fire protection is well recognized. It no
doubt rests in part upon an unwillingness to make the city or
water company an insurer against fire loss. The risk bearing
factor is very likely present in this type of situation. Inasmuch
as most property is insured, to allow recovery here would simply
give the insurance companies a right of subrogation and transfer
the ultimate loss-not from an individual to a group-but from
one group to another. The feeling towards insurance companies
shared by both courts and juries is a guarantee against too many
judgments exonerating them from loss bearing. It is doubtful
whether the distinction can be supported on the usual formulas
of causation.
Among the vast number of negligence cases litigated, those
having to do with water companies is relatively small and inasmuch as the police power of the state has been exercised through
' 1Jennie De Pauw 'Memorial Church v. New Albany Water Works, 193
Ind. 368, 14o N. E. 54o (1923).

This represents the great weight of authority.

For an exceptionally good discussion see opinion by Judge Cardozo in Moch.
Co. v. Rensellaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. i6o, i59 N. E. 896 (1928). Contra:
Harlan Water Co. v. Carter, 22o Ky. 493, 295 S. E. 428 (1927). There are a
number of earlier cases. Florida: Mugge v. Tampa Vaterworks, 52 Fla. 371,
42 So. 8t (i9o6); see Note (09O7) 7 CoL L. REV. 71. N. Carolina: Fisher
v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N. C. 375, 38 S. E. 912 (i9oi); cf. Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 2oo U. S. 57, 26 Sup. Ct. I86 (I9O6); Highway
Trailer Co. v. Janesville Elec. Co. v. "Morgan, 187 Wis. I61, 2o4 N. W. 773
(1925) ; see Note (1924) 3 Wis. L. REv. 369.
City of Huntingburg v. 'Morgen, supra note 6o, at 257.
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legislation giving the control of potable water supplies into the
hands of boards of health with extensive powers, and since these
boards have accomplished so much through administrative procedures outside the courts the instances of injury to health and
life because of improper water supplies are few. The health departments take better care of the individual in the way of giving
him safe water than he would take of himself and leave him but
little occasion to complain of the purity of the water which he
enjoys in such abundance.
The injurieg which are occasioned by leakage of water are
mostly injuries to property and have apparently been disposed of
with a sufficient degree of satisfaction by the application of well
established formulas of negligence when the leak is really a big
thing doing very large damage and perhaps hazarding life and
limb. It may perhaps be inferred from such cases as the one in
Minnesota already referred to that the courts feel that social policy
calls for something more severe and far-reaching as the test of a
water company's responsibility. The courts herein show that the
law reacts to differences of degree just as do individuals and to
repeat Mr. Justice Holmes' oft quoted expression: " "I am the
last person in the world to quarrel with a distinction simply because it is one of degree. Most distinctions, in my opinion, are
of that sort, and are none the worse for it."
Conclusion
The conclusion which must be drawn from these cases has
been stated in summarizing the discussion of the gas cases. For
the most part the familiar doctrines and formulas of negligence
are employed in solving these cases. It does appear, however,
that a higher standard of care is gradually being evolved in reference to the operation of great utility undertakings. This takes
the form of finding negligence in the failure to use protective
processes and appliances as science makes them available. The
consequence is that loss does tend to be passed from the individual
"Dissenting opinion in Haddock v. Haddock,
Ct. 525, 553 (905).

201

U. S.

562, 631, 26

Sup.
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to the group-supported enterprise. The evidence that a desire
to accomplish this end is the reason for imposing increasingly
strict standards of care is chiefly circumstantial but is occasionally
made express as in the words of the Minnesota court already
quoted, 64 "Natural justice would seem to demand that the enterprise, .

.

the whole community benefited by the enterprise,

should stand the loss rather than the individual."
' Supra note 36.

